Welcome to my first supplemental article to my Don’t Repeat History Series, I knew there may come a point where certain issues would come up and I would have to write more as I stated in my conclusion, well let’s begin.
The Free Republic of Liberland, founded in 2015 on a 7 km² patch of disputed Danube land between Croatia and Serbia, embodies libertarian ideals: minimal government, voluntary contributions, absolute property rights, and blockchain transparency. By 2025, Liberland has achieved remarkable milestones—stable blockchain elections conducted quarterly, a $30 million Danube revitalization plan to restore wetlands and build eco-infrastructure, and over 800,000 e-residency applicants eager to participate in a global libertarian experiment. From 1,200 passport holders to a potential worldwide citizenry, Liberland stands at a crossroads. Yet, proposals for a Senate—modeled on the UK House of Lords with full veto authority over elected representatives from the Liberland Congress—threaten to undermine this vision. This unelected body would allow individuals to literally purchase seats through donations, contributions, or influence, creating an aristocratic class immune to democratic accountability. Even people’s initiatives, the purest form of direct democracy, would be subject to senatorial veto, rendering citizen will powerless. The history of the UK Parliament—from the Model Parliament of 1295 to the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949—reveals how such systems evolve from obstructionist strongholds to scandal-ridden figureheads, while modern abuses involving murder, pedophilia, and corruption expose the moral rot of unearned power. Liberland must reject this path, embracing equal-access voting systems to prevent class division, elite capture, and the corruption that has plagued Britain for centuries. This supports 2025’s infrastructure and peacebuilding goals, preserving the “To Live and Let Live” ethos.
The Origins of Parliament: From Advisory Council to Dual-Class Power
England’s parliamentary tradition began not as a democratic institution but as a tool of royal control. The Anglo-Saxon witenagemot—assemblies of nobles advising the king—evolved under Norman rule into the Curia Regis, a court of tenants-in-chief. By the 13th century, financial pressures forced kings to broaden consultation. Simon de Montfort’s Parliament of 1265, summoned during civil war, included two knights from each shire and two burgesses from major towns alongside barons and clergy—a radical step toward representation. But this was no egalitarian body; commoners were summoned to grant taxes to the king, not to govern the people.
Edward I formalized this in the Model Parliament of 1295, often mythologized as the “mother of parliaments.” He summoned 2 archbishops, 18 bishops, 67 abbots, 6 earls, 41 barons, 98 knights, and 174 citizens—yet the Lords (spiritual and temporal peers) dominated. The Commons petitioned; the Lords advised the king. By the 14th century, the two houses separated physically and functionally. The Commons met in Westminster Chapter House, the Lords in the Queen’s Chamber. The Lords claimed veto power over money bills by 1407, arguing only they could advise the king on finance. This created a structural inequality: elected representatives could propose, but unelected peers could dispose.
The Magna Carta (1215) and Provisions of Oxford (1258) attempted checks on royal power, but the Lords—magnates themselves—used these to entrench their own authority. The Commons grew in influence through taxation control (“no taxation without representation”), but the Lords retained absolute veto. This dual-class system—elected Commons, hereditary Lords—defined British governance for 700 years, setting a dangerous precedent for any nation considering to establish such a body.
Evolution Through Crisis: Restoration, Reform, and Reluctant Surrender
The 1660 Restoration after Cromwell’s Commonwealth reaffirmed the Lords’ role. Charles II needed noble support and restored the house abolished in 1649. The Cavalier Parliament (1661–1679) saw Lords veto Commons bills on religion and finance, reinforcing aristocratic privilege. The Glorious Revolution (1688) and Bill of Rights (1689) curbed the monarch but left the Lords untouched. They blocked Catholic emancipation, Irish reforms, and electoral expansion for decades.
The 19th century exposed the system’s fragility. The Reform Crisis of 1831–1832 saw the Lords reject the Great Reform Bill three times, expanding the electorate from 400,000 to 650,000. Riots erupted in Bristol, Nottingham, and Derby; the Birmingham Political Union mobilized 150,000. King William IV threatened to create 50 pro-reform peers, forcing the Lords to relent. The Reform Act 1832 passed, but only under duress—and the Lords retained veto power.
Industrialization amplified tensions. The People’s Charter (1838) demanded universal suffrage, annual parliaments, and secret ballots—ignored by the Lords. The Corn Laws (1815–1846) protected landowner profits, causing famine in Ireland. When Robert Peel’s Tory government sought repeal in 1846, protectionist Lords nearly blocked it. Only Wellington’s persuasion (“vote or be swamped”) secured passage. The Lords’ veto delayed Catholic emancipation until 1829, Jewish emancipation until 1858, and women’s suffrage until 1918.
The Parliament Act 1911 marked the beginning of the end. Liberal Chancellor David Lloyd George’s “People’s Budget” (1909)—taxing land and inheritance—was vetoed by the Lords, triggering two general elections, the Liberals won both. The Act limited Lords’ veto to two years (reduced to one by the 1949 Act) and removed it from money bills. The Life Peerages Act 1958 allowed non-hereditary appointments, diluting bloodlines. The House of Lords Act 1999 removed 666 of 759 hereditary peers, leaving 92. Today, the Lords delay but cannot defeat Commons legislation. They are a revising chamber—figureheads, like the monarch, with no real power.
The Senate Proposal: Purchased Seats and Absolute Veto
Liberland’s proposed Senate mirrors the pre-1911 House of Lords: unelected, appointed, and armed with veto authority. Worse, entry is purchasable. Draft proposals allow seats via:
• Donations: unknown dollar amount to state projects grants “merit-based” consideration, possibly set at $1million, but no transparency as to how much is really needed.
• LLM Contributions: High Liberland Merits (LLM) holdings—earned or bought—elevate candidates, can also influence the votes in Congressional elections.
• Patronage: Presidential or congressional appointment, rewarding allies.
This creates a pay-to-veto system. A wealthy citizen could donate $1 million, secure a seat, and block any bill—tax policy, land use, e-residency rules—regardless of 99% citizen support. Even people’s initiatives, the cornerstone of direct democracy (as in Switzerland), would be subject to senatorial veto. A referendum passing 80% could be nullified by 50 unelected senators, rendering citizen voice meaningless.
This is not meritocracy—it is oligarchy. My article 4 warned of LLM-driven elitism; a purchasable Senate institutionalizes it. A crypto-whale with 10 million LLM could dominate, vetoing blockchain transparency reforms or budgetary plan reallocations, even voting in who they want to into Congress. Diaspora villages like ARK in Serbia or Montelibero in Montenegro—built on voluntary labor—could see their CLT rules overturned or the CLT revoked by distant elites.
Historical Abuses: Murder, Pedophilia, and Corruption
The Lords’ history is littered with scandal, enabled by unaccountability:
• Lord Lucan (1974): Murdered his children’s nanny, assaulted his wife, then vanished. Protected by aristocratic networks, he evaded justice. His peers closed ranks.
• Lord Janner (alleged pedophile): Accused in 1991 of abusing boys at care homes. Police investigations were dropped thrice. He sat in the Lords until 2014, dying before trial in 2015. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) found “institutional failure” to prosecute due to his status.
• Jimmy Savile: Not a peer but knighted and granted access to elite circles, including Lords’ events. Abused over 450 victims, including at BBC and NHS facilities. Establishment protection—via MI5, police, and political connections—delayed exposure until 2012.
• Lord Ahmed (2009): Convicted of dangerous driving causing death, jailed. Previously convicted of sending threatening texts from his phone while driving.
• Lord Hanningfield (2011): Jailed for false expenses claims, defrauding £14,000.
These are not anomalies. The Cash for Peerages scandal (2006) saw Tony Blair nominate donors for life peerages. The Expenses Scandal (2009) exposed Lords claiming £100,000+ annually for “attendance” while asleep. A 2015 investigation found 1 in 6 life peers donated over £100,000 to political parties.
Even as figureheads, Lords retain influence: committee roles, international delegations, and soft power. The 92 hereditary peers—survivors of 1999 reform—include dukes, earls, and viscounts, symbols of a class system Liberland must reject.
Why Liberland Must Choose a Different Path
Liberland’s libertarian DNA rejects hierarchy. A Senate creates two classes of citizenship:
1. Common citizens: Vote in blockchain elections, propose initiatives, pay taxes.
2. Senators: Purchased seats, veto power, immunity from recall.
This violates NAP and equality. The UK retains this divide: 800+ Lords vs. 650 MPs. Hereditary peers still sit by birthright. Life peers are appointed, not elected. Liberland would import this anachronism into a digital micronation.
History shows unelected houses serve no essential function. Pre-1911, they obstructed. Post-1911, they revise grammar. Switzerland thrives with direct democracy and no upper house. Liechtenstein’s 25-member Landtag has no veto chamber. Liberland’s 800,000 prospective citizens—engineers, coders, entrepreneurs—need no aristocratic oversight.
The DAO Alternative: Equal Access, No Veto
Equal-access DAOs eliminate class division:
• All citizens vote equally on policy, initiatives, and budgets via blockchain.
• No veto chamber—majority rules, with sunset clauses (Article 8) for adaptability.
• People’s initiatives pass directly if 50%+1 support, unless the constitution requires a higher thresholds, but with no senatorial block.
• Transparency: Every vote, donation, and decision on-chain.
Civics modules (Article 9) teach the Lords’ failures: Model Parliament’s inequality, 1832 riots, 1911 crisis, Janner’s impunity. Citizens and E-residents learn why veto power corrupts.
2025 Integration: Unity Over Division
A Senate would derail Liberland’s goals:
• Danube Plan: Senators could veto projects favoring people they don’t like.
• E-residency scaling: Elites could block inclusive policies.
• Croatian blockades: Digital unity via DAOs counters external pressure; a divided government weakens response.
Conclusion: A Classless Future
The UK House of Lords—born in 1295, humbled in 1911, exposed in scandal after scandal since its origins—offers Liberland a clear warning. A purchasable Senate with veto power over people’s initiatives creates oligarchy, not governance. It divides citizens, invites corruption, and betrays libertarianism. By rejecting this path and embracing equal-access voting systems, Liberland ensures every voice matters, every initiative counts, and no one buys justice. This is the future of freedom—classless, transparent, and unbreakable.
I don’t know if it is centuries old American blood in me or not but I do not know how we can call ourselves libertarians and yet allow such an institution to be incorporated into the body politic of a country that is supposed to be the freest nation on earth when at the very beginning of it there exists a body that has such overarching veto power over the supposed freest nation on earth. Those senators are not angels but common men. As James Madison famously said, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” It is precisely because the senators are not devine angels that we shall have no need for them. Lord Acton said, “Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” the senate would have absolute power over the people and government of Liberland, even if if they say they will only use their power when it is necessary for the well being of Liberland means they inherently don’t trust the people of Liberland with absolute power which is where in a libertarian society it is supposed to rest upon. Under no circumstance can this body be allowed to retain ultimate veto powers over the people or over their lawfully elected government.