I would like to draw the attention to ‘qudratic voting’ (‘QV’) rather than the usual democratic ‘tyranny of the majority’. Firstly because quadratic voting is mathematically provably the most fair of voting methods, and secondly because I feel it goes very well hand in hand with the spirit of a meritocratic society like that of Liberland.
In QV all eligble voters can cast one or more votes on their favourite issue such that 1 vote costs 1 merit, 2 votes cost 4 merits, and N votes cost N² merits.
At the end of the voting procedure the issue with the most votes have won, and the pool of spent merits are distributed in equal shares among all who cast a vote. Remaining merits ($num_merits mod $num_voters) are kept in the pool for a later voting procedure.
Let’s say we have two issue — “aye” and ”nay” — and four voters who cast a number of votes:
- casts 1 vote (1 merit) on aye
- casts 2 votes (4 merits) on nay
- casts 5 votes (25 merits) on aye
- casts 10 votes (100 merits) on nay
Altogether 6 votes for aye, and 12 votes for nay. Since the 18 votes have been “bought” with 130 merits, the four voters will receive 32 merits each from the pool, and 2 merits will be passed on to the next voting procedure.
The fact that a voter can cast more than one vote means that people can spend more merits on issues that are close to their heart, and just cast a single vote on issues for which they don’t care so much, but still want to express their opinion.
On the other hand, the quadratic nature means that it quickly becomes expensive to buy votes (e.g., 100 votes will cost 10,000 merits that will be given back to everyone in equal shares), thereby preventing a few people from effecticely hi-jacking the election. And of course it should also be possible to impose a maximum number of votes per voter per issue (e.g., noone should be able to cast more than 10 votes on a single issue).
And because active voters receive at least the cost of 1 vote in return, eligible voters have an incentive to cast at least 1 vote, something that will likely increase the percentage of active voters to the benefit of everyone.
As far as I can tell, the use and circulation of vote tokens will lend itself well to a blockchain implementation, but that is a debate for some other time.
Quadratic voting is a procedure that a group of people can use to jointly choose a collective good for themselves. Each person can buy votes for or against a proposal by paying into a fund the square of the number of votes that he or she buys. The money is then returned to voters on a per capita basis. Weyl and Lalley prove that the collective decision rapidly approximates efficiency as the number of voters increases. By contrast, no extant voting procedure is efficient. Majority rule based on one-person-one-vote notoriously results in tyranny of the majority – a large number of people who care only a little about an outcome prevail over a minority that cares passionately, resulting in a reduction of aggregate welfare.